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Scenario events are further detailed
Fault Tree 
Influence Diagram 
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Influence diagrams
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One integrated BBN
=
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Model quantification
Quantification = Unconditional and conditional probability 
distributions
Probabilities are expressed per flight
 requires denominator data
# of occurrences                     numerator

# of flights                          denominator
A B
P (A)       P(B)
P(B| A)
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Data configuration control
Origin and quality of the data are held in a separate 
database:
CATS PArameters With Sources [CATSPAWS]
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Uncertainties
xEpistemic  (lack of knowledge)
xAleatory (randomness of input parameters)
Uncertainty in risk assessment of socio-technical system is 
largely aleatory
=> Uncertainty is reduced by better assessment techniques
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Advantage of Bayesian Belief Nets
Events can have multiple states
? Example: Fatigue
Interdependencies are an integral part of the model
Degree of Sleepiness Scale 
Rating 
Feeling active, vital, alert, or wide awake 1 
Functioning at high levels, but not at peak; able to concentrate 2 
Awake, but relaxed; responsive but not fully alert 3 
Somewhat foggy, let down 4 
Foggy; losing interest in remaining awake; slowed down 5 
Sleepy, woozy, fighting sleep; prefer to lie down 6 
No longer fighting sleep, sleep onset soon; having dream-like thoughts 7 
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The complete model (so far)
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Preliminary results
BBN Node Baseline 
risk
Crosswind 
> 15 kts
Dry
Crosswind 
> 15 kts
Rain
Crosswind 
< 15 kts
Dry
Crosswind 
< 15 kts
Rain
Runway 
overrun 
(landing)
1.0 2.8 185.8 0.7 182.6
Runway 
veer-off 
(landing)
1.0 5.1 152.1 0.8 149.2
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Conclusion
User test phase starts this year.
Expected and unexpected outcomes will be carefully 
evaluated.
